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ABSTRACT: The international framework for maritime search and rescue relies on state actors 
establishing regions of responsibility supported by private shipmasters acting in compliance with 
traditional duties to rescue persons in distress at sea. Despite revisions to the framework’s founda-
tional treaty, questions persist about the extent of state responsibilities and the interaction between 
those responsibilities and international human rights law. Over the past three years, non-govern-
mental organizations (NGOs) have provided signifi cant support to the efforts of sovereign actors 
responding to the migration crisis in the Central Mediterranean. Regional governments and civil 
society initially praised NGO operations, but in recent months these groups have come to criticize 
and challenge such operations. Italian authorities have threatened criminal prosecution of NGO de-
ployers and proposed closing national ports to them. Libyan authorities have harassed NGO vessels 
and sought to exclude them from international waters. These actions are consistent with non-entrée 
strategies employed by Mediterranean states in recent years, but are in certain cases of questionable 
legality.  Although controlling irregular migration is properly the responsibility of state actors, re-
cent policies are inconsistent with principles of rule of law and good governance.
KEYWORDS: irregular migration; maritime law; Search and Rescue regime; NGOs; Italy; Libya; 
human rights.
INCERTIDUMBRE, ALERTA Y PELIGRO: LA POSICIÓN PRECARIA DE LAS 
OPERACIONES SEARCH AND RESCUE DE LAS ONG EN EL MEDITERRÁNEO 
CENTRAL
RESUMEN: El marco de referencia internacional para la búsqueda y el salvamento marítimos 
se basa en entidades estatales que establecen regiones de responsabilidad apoyadas por capitanes 
privados que actúan en cumplimiento de las obligaciones tradicionales de rescatar a las personas en 
peligro en el mar. A pesar de las revisiones del tratado fundacional del marco, persisten cuestiones 
sobre el alcance de las responsabilidades estatales y la interacción entre esas responsabilidades y 
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los derechos humanos internacionales.  Durante los últimos tres años, las organizaciones no guber-
namentales (ONG) han prestado un apoyo signifi cativo a las operaciones de las entidades con sobe-
ranía en responder a la crisis migratoria en el Mediterráneo Central. Los gobiernos regionales y la 
sociedad civil inicialmente elogiaron las operaciones de las ONG, pero en los últimos meses estos 
grupos han venido a criticar y desafi ar estas operaciones.  Las autoridades italianas han amenazado 
con enjuiciar a las ONG desplegadas y han propuesto cerrar los puertos a las mismas.  Las autorida-
des libias han hostigado buques de ONG y han tratado de excluirlos de aguas internacionales. Estas 
acciones son congruentes con las estrategias de no entrada utilizadas por los estados regionales en 
los últimos años, pero son en ciertos casos de una legalidad cuestionable.  Aunque el control de la 
migración irregular es propiamente la responsabilidad de los actores estatales, las políticas recientes 
son incompatibles con los principios del estado de derecho y buen gobierno.
PALABRAS CLAVE: inmigración irregular, Derecho del Mar, Régimen de asistencia y salvamento 
marítimo, ONG, Italia, Libia, Derechos Humanos.
INCERTITUDE, ALERTE ET DÉTRESSE:  LA POSITION PRÉCAIRE DES OPÉRATIONS 
SEARCH AND RESCUE DES ONG EN MÉDITERRANÉE CENTRALE
RÉSUMÉ: Le cadre international pour la recherche et le sauvetage maritimes repose sur des acteurs 
étatiques qui créent des régions de responsabilité soutenues par des capitaines privés agissant dans 
le respect des obligations traditionnelles de sauvetage des personnes en détresse en mer. Malgré les 
révisions apportées au traité fondamental du cadre, des questions persistent quant à l’étendue des 
responsabilités de l’État et à l’interaction entre ces responsabilités et le droit international des droits 
de l’homme. Au cours des trois dernières années, les organisations non gouvernementales (ONG) 
ont apporté un soutien important aux efforts des acteurs souverains répondant à la crise migratoire en 
Méditerranée centrale. Les gouvernements régionaux et la société civile ont initialement fait l’éloge 
des opérations des ONG, mais ces derniers mois, ces groupes sont venus critiquer et contester ces 
opérations. Les autorités italiennes ont menacé de poursuivre pénalement les navires déployant des 
ONG et ont proposé de fermer les ports nationaux. Les autorités libyennes ont harcelé des navires 
d’ONG et ont cherché à les exclure des eaux internationales. Ces actions sont conformes aux 
stratégies non-entrées utilisées par les états méditerranéens ces dernières années, mais dans certains 
cas de légalité douteuse. Bien que le contrôle de la migration irrégulière relève de la responsabilité 
des acteurs étatiques, les politiques récentes sont incompatibles avec les principes de l’état de droit 
et de la bonne gouvernance.
MOTS-CLÉS: migration irrégulière; loi maritime; Le régime de recherche et de sauvetage; Les 
ONG; Italie; Libye; droits de l’homme.
I. INTRODUCTION
The following evaluates the current legal and policy challenges facing non-
governmental organizations conducting search and rescue (SAR) operations 
in the Central Mediterranean. Since late 2014, non-governmental organization 
(NGOs) have conducted signifi cant operations in response to the ongoing 
humanitarian crisis, providing aid to vessels in distress and transporting 
rescued individuals to Europe. In the past nine months, however, dramatic 
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policy shifts by both Libyan and Italian authorities have put the future of  
these operations in signifi cant jeopardy. This paper examines the legality and 
policy implications of  those shifts and evaluates the likelihood that these 
operations will be able to continue.
Part II provides background on the framework for provision of  SAR ser-
vices under international law and the response to the current Mediterranean 
crisis from state, regional and private actors. Part III describes the signifi cant 
shifts in policy towards NGO deployers that have occurred since 2016 inclu-
ding Libya’s declaration of  an exclusionary SAR zone and Italy’s seizure of  an 
NGO vessel and investigation into possible NGO collaboration with migrant 
smugglers. Part IV evaluates the legality and implications of  these policies as 
well as Italy’s possible closure of  its ports to some or all NGO vessels. Part V 
offers conclusions and observations.
II. INTERNATIONAL SAR FRAMEWORK, CURRENT CRISIS AND RESPONSES
1. OVERVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL SAR FRAMEWORK AND TERMINOLOGY
Under the existing international legal framework, primary responsibility 
for the provision of  search and rescue services in the world’s seas lies with 
coastal states, which are required to offer such services so as to respond to 
vessels in distress. This obligation in enshrined in the United Nations Con-
vention on the Law of  the Sea2 (UNCLOS) and is further expressed in the 
International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (the SAR Conven-
tion) which states:
Parties shall, as they are able to do so individually or in co-operation with 
other States… participate in the development of  search and rescue services 
to ensure that assistance is rendered to any person in distress at sea. On re-
ceiving information that any person is, or appears to be, in distress at sea, the 
2 United Nations Convention on the Law of  the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/122, Dec. 10, 1982, 
1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (hereinafter “UNCLOS”), Art. 98(b) (“Every coastal State shall promote 
the establishment, operation and maintenance of  an adequate and effective search and rescue 
service regarding safety on and over the sea, and where circumstances so require, by way of  
mutual regional arrangements cooperate with neighboring States for this purpose.”)
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responsible authorities of  a Party shall take urgent steps to ensure that the 
necessary assistance is provided.3
Under the SAR Convention, coastal states are directed to establish na-
tional SAR regions in cooperation with neighboring states and take primary 
responsibility for responding to SAR incidents that occur within their region, 
either through deploying national vessels, coordinating response with other 
states, or tasking non-state actors to respond and render assistance.4 In order 
to effectuate this provision of  service, states are directed to establish national 
rescue co-ordination centers (RCCs) and sub-centers as necessary.5
The SAR Convention defi nes “distress” as “a situation wherein there is a 
reasonable certainty that a person, a vessel or other craft is threatened by gra-
ve and imminent danger and requires immediate assistance.”6 Given the lack 
of  specifi city in this defi nition, in 2014 the European Union Parliament es-
tablished ten factors that RCCs should consider when determining if  rescue 
is necessary in the context of  FRONTEX operations.7 While this framework 
has been criticized as not requiring rescue in cases where a vessel truly is 
3 International Maritime Organization, International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, Art. 1, 
April 27, 1979, 1403 U.N.T.S. 97 (revised version entered into force Jan. 1, 2000) (hereinafter 
“SAR Convention”), at Annex 2.1.1
4 SAR Convention, at Annex 2.1.3
5 Ibidem, at Annex 2.3.
6 Ibidem, at Annex 1.3.13.
7 Establishing Rules for the Surveillance of  the External Sea Borders in the Context of  
Operation Cooperation Coordinated by the European Agency for the Management of  
Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of  the Member States of  the European 
Union, PARL. EUR. DOC. (SEC 656) 9(f) (2014) (“Participating units shall, for the purpose 
of  considering whether the vessel is in a phase of  uncertainty, alert or distress, take into 
account and transmit all relevant information and observations to the responsible Rescue 
Coordination Centre including on: (i) the existence of  a request for assistance, although such 
a request shall not be the sole factor for determining the existence of  a distress situation; 
(ii) the seaworthiness of  the vessel and the likelihood that the vessel will not reach its fi nal 
destination; (iii) the number of  persons on board in relation to the type and condition of  
the vessel; (iv) the availability of  necessary supplies such as fuel, water and food to reach a 
shore; (v) the presence of  qualifi ed crew and command of  the vessel; (vi) the availability and 
capability of  safety, navigation and communication equipment; (vii) the presence of  persons 
on board in urgent need of  medical assistance; (viii) the presence of  deceased persons on 
board; (ix) the presence of  pregnant women or of  children on board; (x) the weather and 
sea conditions, including weather and marine forecasts.”). See DI FILIPPO, M., “Irregular 
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unseaworthy, it is also suffi ciently broad to allow a coastal state to justify in-
terdiction operations in virtually any case of  irregular migration.8
In its 1998 Amendments, the SAR convention defi nes “rescue” as: “an 
operation to retrieve persons in distress, provide for their initial medical or 
other needs, and deliver to a place of  safety.”9 This concept is refi ned further 
in the guidelines to the SAR Convention promulgated by the International 
Maritime Organization’s Maritime Safety Committee in 2004 (2004 IMO 
Guidelines), which defi ne a “place of  safety” as the location where rescue 
operations terminate and where the “survivors’ safety of  life is no longer 
threatened.”10 The 2004 IMO Guidelines specify that what constitutes a “pla-
ce of  safety” will differ depending upon the “particular circumstances” of  
each case and in some cases may include another vessel.11
The 2004 IMO Guidelines also impose specifi c responsibility on the 
coastal state in whose SAR region assistance is required to co-ordinate rescue 
efforts and arrange a “place of  safety” for survivors.12 Importantly, this is not 
explicitly an obligation to permit the disembarkation of  rescued individuals 
within a coastal state’s territory.13 In 2009, the Facilitation Committee of  the 
Migration across the Mediterranean Sea: Problematic Issues Concerning the International 
Rules on Safeguard of  Life at Sea,” Paix et Sécurité Internationales, 1, 2013, at 60. 
8 See COPPENS, J., “Lampedusa: The Impact of  Seaborne Migration on States and Shipping,” 
Mededelingen Koninklijke Belgische Marine Academie:  Communications Academie Royale de Marine 
de Beliguique, Vol. 39, 2015, at 34-5 (discussing possibility of  commercial actors failing to 
provide assistance to vessels); MORENO-LAX, V., “Seeking Asylum in the Mediterranean: 
Against a Fragmentary Reading of  EU Member States’ Obligations Accruing at Sea,” 
International Journal of  Refugee Law, 23(2), 2011, (hereinafter “MORENO LAX, 2011”) at 16; see 
also MORENO-LAX, V. “ The Interdiction of  Asylum Seekers at Sea: Law and (mal)practice 
in Europe and Australia,” Policy Brief  for Kaldor Centre for International Law, 2017, 
(hereinafter “MORENO-LAX, 2017”), at 9 (arguing for development of  SAR operations 
that are distinct from interdiction operations).
9 SAR Convention, at Annex 1.3.2.
10 MSC, “Guidelines on the Treatment of  Persons Rescued at Sea”, MSC Resolution 167(78) 
(20 May 2004), (hereinafter “2004 IMO Guidelines”) at 6.12.
11 2004 IMO Guidelines at 6.12-6.14.
12 2004 IMO Guidelines at 6.7-6.9
13 Id. But see 2004 IMO Guidelines at 6.5 (“The responsibility to provide a place of  safety, or 
to ensure that a place of  safety is provided, falls on the Government responsible for the SAR 
region in with the survivors were recovered.”)
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IMO adopted additional principles regarding disembarkation which clarifi ed 
that the government of  the responsible RCC should accept disembarkation 
of  rescued individuals if  it is not possible to coordinate disembarkation in a 
third country.14 These principles have not, however, been incorporated into 
the SAR convention.15
While the SAR Convention establishes a primary role for coastal states 
in conducting maritime rescue operations, it explicitly acknowledges that 
state-provided rescue units are insuffi cient to assist all persons in distress at 
sea.16  As such, the convention’s framework relies on the traditional duties 
of  all shipmasters to respond to vessels in distress and provides mechanism 
for non-state actors to participate in rescue efforts at the direction of  state 
RCCs.17 Although the SAR Convention applies directly only to state actors, 
the 2004 IMO Guidelines are directed as well at private shipmasters; the 
guidelines remind them of  the role their traditional obligations and provide 
operational guidance on complying with those obligations.18
2. REVISIONS AND PERSISTENT UNCERTAINTIES
14 Int’l Maritime Org., 194 (3), Principles Relating to Administrative Procedures for Disembarking Per-
sons Rescued at Sea (Jan. 22, 2009) at 2.3 (“If  disembarkation from the rescuing ship cannot be 
arranged swiftly elsewhere, the Government responsible for the SAR area should accept the 
disembarkation of  the persons rescued in accordance with immigration laws and regulations 
of  each Member State into a place of  safety under its control in which the persons rescued 
can have timely access to post rescue support.”)
15 PAPASTAVRIDIS, E., “Rescuing Migrants at Sea: The Responsibility of  States Under 
International Law (September 27, 2011), p.13. Available at <https://ssrn.com/
abstract=1934352> (last accessed 28 August 2017); DI FILIPPO at 70 (discussing IMO 
negotiations on this issue). 
16 2004 IMO Guidelines, at 5.1
17 Ibidem, at 5.1, Appendix 1.  
18 2004 IMO Guidelines, at 5.1. The IMO also produces the International Aeronautical and 
Maritime Search and Rescue Manual, Volume III of  which is to be carried aboard private 
vessels and which provides guidance on how such vessels should operate in response to SAR 
incidents.  The International Convention for the Safety of  Life at Sea also requires ships to 
carry an up-to-date copy of  Volume III. International Conventions for the Safety of  Life at Sea, 
Nov. 1, 1974, 32 U.S.T. 47, 164 U.N.T.S. 113. (hereinafter “SOLAS Convention”), at Ch. V, 
Regulation 21.
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Since adoption of  the SAR Convention in 1979, the convention has been 
amended to address emerging practical concerns.  In the face of  limited 
adoption of  the convention by state parties, an amended Annex—which 
includes the current defi nition of  rescue—was adopted in 1998 and entered 
into force in 2000.19 Following a high visibility incident in 2001 in which a 
Norwegian vessel that had recovered 438 irregular migrants in distress was 
denied entry into Australian ports, the Convention was amended to clarify 
state responsibilities in cooperating to coordinate disembarkation.20 This 
revision also included the issuance of  guidance defi ning place of  safety.21
Notwithstanding these revisions, however, questions remain regarding 
fundamental elements of  the international SAR system.  First, the full scope 
of  the duty on coastal states has not been defi ned as the SAR convention 
provides limited guidance on what constitutes suffi cient provision of  services. 
Both national resources and demand for SAR services vary signifi cantly 
between states, and the language requiring states only to provide services 
“as they are able” makes a failure to meet this duty diffi cult to enforce.22 
For instance, despite the language in the SAR convention suggesting that 
states should seek to “ensure that assistance is rendered to any person in 
distress at sea,” there is no expectation that coastal states perform complete, 
comprehensive tracking and monitoring of  all vessels within their SAR 
regions at all times.23
Additionally, the extent of  coastal states’ obligation to disembark migrants 
rescued in their SAR regions in the absence of  any other state accepting them 
is in unclear.24 Although some states interpret the 2004 IMO Guidelines as 
19 “International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR),” International Maritime 
Organization, 2017, <http://www.imo.org/en/About/conventions/listofconventions/pag-
es/international-convention-on-maritime-search-and-rescue-(sar).aspx>.
20 PAPASTAVRIDIS, loc. cit., at 11; see generally KENNEY, F. & TASIKAS, V., “The Tampa Incident: 
IMO Perspectives and Responses on the Treatment of  Persons Rescued at Sea,” Pacifi c Rim 
and Policy Journal, Vol. 12.1, 2003; 2004 IMO Guidelines, at 6.7-6.9
21 2004 IMO Guidelines, at 6.12
22 Papastavridis suggests that SAR convention imposes obligations on conduct but not of  
result. PAPASTAVRIDIS, loc. cit., at 11. 
23 SAR Convention, at Annex 2.1.1; COPPENS, at 47-55.
24 GALLAGHER, A. & DAVID, F., The International Law of  Migrant Smuggling, 2014, Cambridge 
University Press, at 460.
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requiring disembarkation, others do not, and still others do not recognize 
the guidelines at all.25 As such, differences in interpretation and differences in 
applicable law leave this area ill defi ned.
Finally, the framework leaves an unclear gap between the concept of  
“place of  safety” as defi ned under the 2004 IMO Guidelines and the human 
rights law principal of  non-refoulment.  For while the 2004 IMO Guidelines 
say that states should consider whether the “lives and freedoms” of  refugees 
would be threatened in a port of  disembarkation, the language is qualifi ed 
and does not textually or functionally incorporate the full obligations under 
human rights law.26  This discrepancy may represent an exploitable gap for 
states seeking to evade such obligations in favor of  other national interests.
3. CURRENT CRISIS AND RESPONSES: 
STATE, REGIONAL AND COMMERCIAL ACTORS
As has been well reported, over the past four years, the number of  people 
seeking to enter Europe via irregular maritime migration across the Central 
Mediterranean from Libya to Italy has increased dramatically.27 The increase 
has been traced to persistent political, economic and social instability in sub-
Saharan Africa as well as the failure of  the Libyan state following the fall 
of  Qaddafi  in 2011.28  The increase began in 2014 when irregular entrants 
more than tripled, increasing to 170,760 from 45,298 the year before. Arrivals 
decreased slightly to 153,946 in 2015 but then reached a new high in 2016 
with 181,459. Parallel to these numbers of  arrivals are the numbers of  
25 COPPENS, loc. cit., at 37.
26 2004 IMO Guidelines, at 6.17
27 Given the specifi c dynamics at play in the Central Mediterranean and the prevalence of  NGO 
deployers there, this paper will concentrate on that region.  See generally, Joint Communication 
to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council, “Migration on the 
Central Mediterranean route: Managing fl ows, saving lives,” 25 January 2017 (hereinafter, 
“Joint Communication”) <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:6e6590bb-
e2fa-11e6-ad7c-01aa75ed71a1.0001.02/DOC_1&format=PDF>; Frontex, Annual Risk 
Analysis 2017 <http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annual_Risk_
Analysis_2017.pdf  >, p. 19.
28 “Mixed Migration Trends in Libya: Changing Dynamics and Protection Challenges,” UN-
HCR, July 2017 <http://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2017/7/595a03bb4/insecurity-eco-
nomic-crisis-abuse-exploitation-libya-push-refugees-migrants.html>.
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deaths of  migrants at sea. In 2014, 3,092 deaths were recorded in the Central 
Mediterranean; in 2015, that number dropped slightly to 2,876, but then 
increased to 4,581 in 2016.29 Through June of  2017 both arrivals and deaths 
in the region were greater than at the same time in the previous year.30 As of  
this writing, however, both arrivals and deaths in the Central Mediterranean 
are slightly lower than this time last year, due to a signifi cant decrease in 
arrivals beginning in July 2017.31
The state response has been well documented.32 In October 2013, 
following the deaths of  359 migrants off  the coast of  Lampedusa, the Italian 
Navy instituted a large scale search and rescue initiative, Mare Nostrum, with 
the goal of  engaging migrant vessels in distress outside the Italian SAR 
region and transporting them to Italy.33 Though credited for saving more 
than 130,000 people, this operation was discontinued in 2014 due to lack 
of  funds and under criticism that it constituted a “pull factor” incentivizing 
irregular migrations.34 In March 2015, Italy began a smaller scale operation 
Mare Sicuro concentrating on disruption of  smuggling networks nearer to the 
29 Missing Migrants, “Focus on Mediterranean,” International Organization for Migration, 
August 2017, <https://missingmigrants.iom.int/region/rmediterranean>.
30 Missing Migrants, “Mediterranean migrant arrival reach 116,692 in 2017; 2,405 deaths,” 
International Organization for Migration, 8 August 2017, <https://missingmigrants.iom.
int/mediterranean-migrant-arrivals-reach-116692-2017-2405-deaths>.
31 Missing Migrants, “No Migrant Deaths at Sea in Last 20 Days as Mediterranean Arrivals 
Reach 121,517 for 2017,” International Organization for Migration, 29 August 2017, 
<https://www.iom.int/news/no-migrant-deaths-sea-last-20-days-mediterranean-arrivals-
reach-121517-2017>.
32 See e.g.. CUTTITTA, P., “From the CAP ANAMUR to MARE NOSTRUM: Humanitarianism 
and Migration Controls at the EU’s Maritime Borders, Cleer Working Papers, 2014 
(hereinafter “Cuttitta, From the CAP ANAMUR to MARE NOSTRUM”); CUTTITTA, 
P., “Repoliticization Through Search and Rescue?  Humanitarian NGOs and Migration 
Management in the Central Mediterranean,” Geopolitics, 2017, (hereinafter “CUTTITTA, 
Repoliticization Through Search and Rescue”) at 6-8. State coverage has also been extensive 
in the international press.  
33 TAYLOR, A., “Italy Ran An Operation that Saved Thousands of  Migrants from Drowning 
in the Mediterranean. Why did it stop?” The Washington Post, April 20, 2015, <https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/04/20/italy-ran-an-operation- 
that-save-thousands-of-migrants-from-drowning-in-the-mediterranean-why-did-it-stop/>.
34 Idem.
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Libyan coast.35 Italy continues to conduct SAR operations via its Navy and 
Coast Guard, which in 2016 were among the three entities rescuing the most 
migrants in distress.36
When Italy launched Mare Nostrum in 2013, it assumed responsibility for 
coordinating search and rescue efforts throughout what had been designated 
as the Libyan SAR region.37 Since 2016, however, following the United Nations 
recognition of  the Libyan Government of  National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli, 
the Libyan coast guard has resumed operations and is increasingly conducting 
operations to interdict irregular migrant vessels.38 Italy has provided explicit 
support for these efforts including providing economic support to the Libyan 
government and training to the Libyan coast guard.39 It has also provided the 
Libyan coast guard four speedboats and has promised to deliver six more, 
and has deployed a patrol boat to assist the Libyan coast guard as part of  
a proposed larger plan to provide naval support to Libya in order to stop 
migrants within Libyan territorial waters.40 Italy has also expressed support 
for Libya’s declaration on 10 August 2017 of  a SAR exclusionary zone.41
35 “Operazione Mare Sicuro,” Ministero della Difesa, <http://www.marina.difesa.it/co-
sa-facciamo/operazioni-in-corso/Pagine/MareSicuro.aspx>.
36 The third entity rescuing the most individuals was NGO deployers considered as a 
group.  Amnesty International, A Perfect Storm: The Failure of  European Policies in the Central 
Mediterranean, 2017, at 1.5, (hereafter “Amnesty International, A Perfect Storm”) <https://
www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur03/6655/2017/en/>.  
37 CUTTITTA, Repoliticization of  Search and Rescue... cit., at 17; Amnesty International, A 
Perfect Storm, at 21; CUTTITTA, From CAP ANAMUR to MARE NOSTRUM... cit., at 26.
38 Amnesty International, A Perfect Storm, at 2.2.
39 BACZYNSKYA, G. & SCHERER, S., “Italy vows to help Libya seal borders, urges EU to do 
same” REUTERS, 2 February 2017, <http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-europe-migrants-
eu-libya-idUKKBN15H19T>.
40 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, A Perfect Storm, at 2.1; “Italy impounds NGO rescue ship and 
sends navy patrol boat to Libya” The Guardian, 2 August 2017, <https://www.theguardian.
com/world/2017/aug/02/italy-impounds-ngo-rescue-ship-sends-navy-patrol-boat-to-
libya-migrant-refugee-route-europe>.
41 GONZALEZ, R., “El Gobierno libio prohíbe a las ONG entrar en sus aguas,” El País, 12 August 
2017, < https://elpais.com/internacional/2017/08/11/actualidad/1502454171_609107.
html>; MARCIANO, C. & FITZPATRICK, M., “Italy applauds Libya’s decision on migrant ‘search 
and rescue’ zone,” Yahoo News, 13 August 2017, <https://www.yahoo.com/news/german-
ngo-halts-migrant-rescue-operations-off-libya-093725692.html>.
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The European Union’s response to the increased migration fl ows in 
the Central Mediterranean over t he past three years has concentrated on 
increasing border security and disrupting criminal smuggling networks with 
search and rescue as a secondary objective. In the fall of  2014 following 
the discontinuation of  Mare Nostrum, the EU border control organization 
FRONTEX initiated Operation Triton with the express goal of  increasing border 
security and surveillance.42 Initiated with limited funds and concentrating only 
on the area immediately surrounding Italian territorial waters, the budget was 
increased threefold in 2015 in order to extend the area of  operation 138nm 
south of  Italy into the SAR regions of  both Italy and Malta.43 Separately, 
EUNAVFORMED Operation Sophia, begun in June 2015, has the primary 
goal of  dismantling the business model of  human traffi ckers in the region, 
though again search and rescue is considered an important secondary goal.44 
Like Italy, the European Union has also provided fi nancial support to Libya 
to training and capacity building of  its coast guard.45
Notwithstanding the dramatic increase in migration from Libya and 
the disorder of  the Libyan state, it is important to note that no action has 
been taken to limit Libya’s sovereign authority over its territorial waters. In 
October 2015, the United Nations Security Council approved resolution 
2240 (UNSCR 2240), which expanded the rights of  member states to engage 
vessels suspected of  migrant smuggling in international waters off  the 
42 “Joint Operation Triton,” FRONTEX, (hereinafter “Joint Operation Triton”) 10 October 
2016, <http://frontex.europa.eu/pressroom/hot-topics/joint-operation-triton-italy--
ekKaes>.
43 Joint Operation Triton; “EU Operations in the Mediterranean Sea,” European Commission, 
4 October 2016, <https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/fi les/what-we-
do/policies/securing-eu-borders/fact-sheets/docs/20161006/eu_operations_in_the_
mediterranean_sea_en.pdf>.
44 Joint Operation Triton; Presentation by CF Carlos Posada Novoa at University of  Cadiz, 
Faculty of  Law, 20 February 2017; BULMAN, M., “EU refugee anti-smuggling mission is 
driving deaths in the Mediterranean, fi nds report” Independent, 11 July 2017, <http://www.
independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/eu-refugee-rescue-mission-mediterranean-people-
smuggling-north-africa-report-migrant-crisis-european-a7835631.html>.
45 Joint Communication, at 6-8; Press release, “EU Trust Fund for Africa adopts €90million 
programme on protection of  migrants and improved migration management in Libya,” 
European Commission, 12 April 2017, <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-951_
en.htm>. 
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coast of  Libya but did not permit the engagement of  vessels within Libya’s 
territorial waters.46 The Security Council renewed UNSCR 2240 via resolution 
2312 (UNSCR 2312) for a further twelve-month period in October of  2016.47 
During the fi rst years of  the crisis, commercial ships were relied upon 
heavily to provide rescue services given the signifi cant merchant traffi c 
through the Central Mediterranean, and in 2014 these vessels performed 
approximately 25% of  all maritime rescues there.48 Rescue operations can 
impose signifi cant costs on merchant vessels and can be very dangerous as 
commercial ships are not generally equipped or trained for such a mission.49 
Unsurprisingly, the commercial shipping industry has been vocal since the 
beginning of  the crisis encouraging state actors to devote more resources 
to search and rescue. In 2015, the European Community Shipowners 
Association called upon the European Union to develop a comprehensive 
search and rescue mission equal to the scope of  Italy’s Mare Nostrum.50 
Likewise at a meeting in 2015 of  the International Maritime Organization 
on mixed sea migrations, representatives of  International Chamber of  
Shipping (ICS) emphasized the dangers and unsustainability of  reliance on 
46 Security Council Res. 2240 (2015) (Oct. 9); See also Press Release, Security Council, Adopt-
ing Resolution 2240 (2015), Security Council Authorizes member States to Intercept Vessels off  Libyan 
Coast Suspected of  Migrant Smuggling, UNITED NATIONS, Oct. 9, 2015, <http://www.un.org/
press/en/2015/sc12072.doc.htm>. See WILSON, B., “The Mediterranean Migrant Crisis: 
Key Considerations for the UN Security Council,” Harvard National Security Journal, 1 (2015), 
<http://harvardnsj.org/2015/10/mediterranean-migrant-crisis/>.
47 Meetings Coverage, “Adopting Resolution 2312 (2016), Security Council Extends Autho-
rization to Intercept Vessels Suspected of  Illegal Smuggling from Libya, 6 October 2016, 
<https://www.un.org/press/en/2016/sc12543.doc.htm>.
48 Strategic Note, “Irregular Migration via the Central Mediterranean,” European Commission 
European Political Strategy Center, 22, 2 February 2017,  (hereinafter “Irregular Migration 
via the Central Mediterranean) <https://ec.europa.eu/epsc/sites/epsc/fi les/strategic_
note_issue_22_0.pdf>, at 4; See CUTTITTA, Repoliticization of  Search and Rescue... cit., at 6-8 
(discussing state posture towards commercial rescue prior to 2013). 
49 KILPATRICK, R. & SMITH, A. “The International Legal Obligation to Rescue During Mass 
Migration at Sea: Navigating the Sovereign and Commercial Dimensions of  a Mediterranean 
Crisis,” U.S.F. Maritime Law Journal, Vol. 28 No. 2, at 149-159.
50 European Community Shipowners’ Association “EU Mediterranean Crisis Summit 
‘Appears to Fall Short’, says Merchant Shipping Industry,” 2015, <http://www.ecsa.eu/9-
latest-news/199-eu-mediterranean-crisis-summit-appears-to-fallshort-says-merchant-
shipping-industry>.
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commercial shipping.51 At the same time, representatives have stressed that 
commercial vessels will continue to abide by their legal obligations.52 In 2015, 
the ICS produced a guide for shipping commercial vessels on their roles and 
obligations in performing rescues at sea.53 Since 2015, however, reliance on 
commercial vessels has decreased following an increased provision of  state 
resources and an increased role of  NGO deployers.54
4. OPERATIONS OF NGO DEPLOYERS
In contrast to the state and commercial actors for whom SAR is generally a 
secondary concern, a signifi cant number of  non-governmental organizations 
have deployed vessels in the Central Mediterranean with the specifi c goal of  
providing aid and rescue services to migrants in distress during the current 
crisis.  Beginning with the Maltese group Migrant Offshore Aid Station 
(MOAS) which launched its fi rst vessel in August 2014, by the summer of  2017 
these NGOs included Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), SOS Méditerranée, 
Sea-Watch, Sea-Eye, Jugend Rettet, Refugee Boat Foundation, Pro-Activa 
Open Arms, and Save the Children.55
51 See “High-Level Meeting to Address Unsafe Mixed Migration by Sea (4-5 March 2015), 
International Maritime Organization, <http://www.imo.org/en/About/Events/Pages/
High-Level-Meeting-to-Address-Unsafe-Mixed-Migration-by-Sea-(March-2015).aspx>
52 International’ Chamber of  Shipping, Shipping Industry Calls on EU Leaders to be Decisive 
and Immediately Increase Mediterranean Search and Rescue Resources, April 22, 2015, <http://www.
ics-shipping.org/news/press-releases/view-article/2015/04/22/shipping-industry-calls-
on-eu-leaders-to-be-decisive-and-immediately-increase-mediterranean-search-and-rescue-
resources>. See also SAUL, J., In Mediterranean, Commercial Ships Scoop Up Desperate Human Cargo, 
Reuters, Sept. 21, 2015, <http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/europe-
migrants-ship/>.
53 INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION, U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, and 
INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF SHIPPING, Rescue at Sea: A Guide to Principles and Practice As Applied 
to Refugee and Migrants, 2015.
54 See Irregular Migration via the Central Mediterranean, at 6-7 (arguing that reliance on 
commercial vessels has decreased in part since 2014 as SAR operations by state and NGO 
vessels have moved closer to the Libyan shore and away from the main traffi c routes of  
commercial vessels through the Strait of  Sicily). 
55 Irregular Migration via the Central Mediterranean, at 2.  See also, CUSUMANO, E., “Emptying 
the sea with a spoon?  Non-governmental providers of  migrant search and rescue in the 
Mediterranean, Marine Policy 75, 2017, at 92-94.
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Over the course of  their operations through August 2017, NGO 
deployers had come to perform a signifi cant share of  total migrant rescues 
in the Central Mediterranean.  In 2014, their contribution was negligible 
when compared with the Italian Navy’s Mare Nostrum operation, the Italian 
Coast Guard, and merchant vessels.56  By 2015, however, their operations had 
surpassed merchant vessels in number of  search and rescue responses, and 
by 2016, they had surpassed the Italian Coast guard as well, making them the 
second most active provider of  SAR services in Central Mediterranean—
rescuing fewer people than the Italian Navy but more than of  the Italian 
Coast Guard, EUNAVFORMED, FRONTEX and merchant vessels.57
NGO deployers have two primary models for support to migrant vessels 
in distress. The model of  larger NGOs is to conduct full-fl edged SAR 
operations, rescuing migrants at sea, transferring them to their own vessels 
and transporting them to Italian ports of  safety.58 Smaller groups, however, 
have provided mainly on-site aid to migrants in the form of  water, life jackets, 
and emergency medical care while state vessels or larger NGOs conduct the 
actual rescue and transport.59 These different strategies are driven both by 
resource constraints and institutional politics.60 While some NGOs such as 
MOAS have accepted public funds to support their efforts, others such as 
MSF have rejected government funds so as to maintain their independence.61 
NGO deployers have, until recently, operated in explicit cooperation with 
state authorities and sovereign vessels. NGOs in the Central Mediterranean 
coordinate their operations with the Italian RCC and are in constant contact 
both to receive and pass along information regarding possible vessels in 
distress.62 NGOs that make initial contact with migrant vessels often transfer 
56 Idem.
57 Id.; see also Amnesty International, A Perfect Storm, at 16, (indicating that this trend of  
signifi cant NGO participation continued through April 2017).
58 CUSUMANO, loc. cit., at 92.  
59 Idem.
60 Id. See also CUTTITTA, Repoliticization of  Search and Rescue, at 8-12 (discussing political 
orientations of  MOAS, MSF and Sea-Watch).
61 “Doctors Without Borders Says It Won’t Take E.U. Money for Refugees,” New York 
Times, 17 June 2016.  <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/18/world/europe/doctors-
without-borders-says-it-wont-take-eu-money-for-refugees.html?_r=0>.
62 CUTTITTA, Repoliticization of  Search and Rescue, at 14-15.
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them to other NGO vessels or to state vessels for transport to Italy.63  It 
has been common practice for state vessels participating in Operation 
Sophia to position themselves behind NGO deployers in order to allow the 
humanitarian vessels to engage migrants fi rst and then to respond only where 
migrant vessels passed through their lines.64 In July 2016 the US Navy guided-
missile destroyer USS Carney responded to a migrant vessel in distress in 
the Central Mediterranean and provided aid to the migrants via rigid-hull 
infl atable boats until the migrants were rescued and taken to safety by a SOS 
Méditerranée vessel.65
III. OPPOSITION TO NGO DEPLOYERS
Through the end of  2016, NGO deployers enjoyed broad support from 
both governments and civil society.66 Beginning in late 2016 and over the 
course of  2017, however, a dramatic shift in rhetoric and policy towards 
NGO deployers has occurred. In Italy and the EU, rhetoric regarding 
NGOs has shifted from praise and support to allegations that NGOs have 
contributed to the humanitarian crisis in the Central Mediterranean and have 
perhaps colluded with migrant smugglers. Policy shifts include the opening of  
investigations on NGO operations and funding, the introduction of  a Code 
of  Conduct for NGO deployers and the seizure of  a NGO vessel. Likewise, 
Libya has increased its coast guard patrols and has recently excluded NGO 
deployers from a large area off  its coats.  As of  this writing, NGO operations 
have decreased dramatically and the prospect of  their continued operations 
is bleak.
63 Id. See also “Aid groups snub Italian code of  conduct on Mediterranean rescues,” The 
Guardian, 31 July 2017 <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/31/aid-groups-
snub-italian-code-conduct-mediterranean-rescues> (discussing opposition to proposed 
Code of  Conduct which would prohibit NGOs from transferring migrants between vessels). 
64 PEZZANI, L. “Blaming the Rescuers,” Goldsmiths, 9 June 2017, <http://blamingtherescuers.
org/>.  
65 JONES, W. “USS Carney Aids in Rescue of  97 Migrants in Mediterranean Sea,” U.S. Na-
val Forces Europe and Africa, 30 July 2016, <http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_
id=95950>.
66 CUSAMANO, loc. cit., at 94-5; Amnesty International, A Perfect Storm, at 17.
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1. CRITICISM, ACCUSATIONS AND REGULATIONS BY ITALY
The initial criticism leveled against NGO deployers is that they, along with 
any SAR operations that transport rescued migrants to Europe, constitute a 
“pull factor” for irregular migration, encouraging migrants to attempt the 
dangerous journey with the goal of  entering Europe illegally.67 In February 
2017, FRONTEX asserted:  “Migrants and refugees — encouraged by 
the stories of  those who had successfully made it in the past — attempt 
the dangerous crossing since they are aware of  and rely on humanitarian 
assistance to reach the EU.”68 Similarly, FRONTEX suggested that SAR 
operations effectively accomplish the mission of  migrant smugglers, 
specifi cally providing maritime transport to Europe.69 This was echoed in a 
strategic note on migration patterns published by the European Commission 
the same month which stated:
The majority of  irregular immigrants and refugees not arriving in Italy are 
actually being transported most of  the way on vessels provided by European 
navies, coast guards, and NGOs— thereby facilitating the work of  the 
smugglers.70
While these criticisms could apply to all entities performing SAR services, 
additional allegations have been lodged against NGO deployers that they 
may have acted in collusion with migrant smugglers. In December 2016, 
the Financial Times reported that it had received a confi dential internal 
FRONTEX document in which the organization stated that it had “clear 
indications” that migrants had been directed by smugglers how to engage 
NGO vessels.71 The document purportedly looked at a period in October 
67 Blaming the Rescuers at “Toxic Narratives”; see also Amnesty International, “Italy: 
Losing the moral compass: Innuendos against NGOs which rescue lives in the central 
Mediterranean,” 28 April 2017, <https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/
EUR3061522017ENGLISH.pdf>. 
68 FRONTEX, Annual Risk Analysis 2017, at 32.
69 Idem (“… all parties involved in SAR operations in the Central Mediterranean [including 
NGO deployers] unintentionally help criminals achieve their objectives at minimum cost, 
strengthen their business model by increasing the chances of  success.”). 
70 Irregular Migration via the Central Mediterranean, at 7.
71 “EU border force fl ags concerns over charities’ interaction with migrant smugglers,” 
Financial Times, 15 December 2016.  <https://www.ft.com/content/3e6b6450-c1f7-11e6-
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2016 when migrant distress signals had decreased and when NGO rescue 
had increased as evidence of  coordination between NGOs and smugglers. 
Additionally, it suggested that NGOs had worked to attract migrant vessels 
by positioning highly illuminated vessels near Libyan waters.  A week later, 
the Financial Times issued a correction stating that FRONTEX had “raised a 
number of  concerns about [NGOs’] interactions with migrant smugglers… 
but had not itself  made a direct accusation of  collusion.”72
Italian authorities, however, made such accusations shortly thereafter. 
In February 2017, the chief  Prosecutor in Catania, Sicily, Carmelo Zuccaro, 
announced that he had begun an investigation into whether there has been any 
coordination between NGO deployers and migrant smugglers and specifi cally 
suggested that NGOs may have received funds from migrant smugglers.73 In 
April of  2017 the Defense committee of  the Italian parliament initiated an 
investigation into the operations and fi nances of  NGOs performing SAR 
operations in the Central Mediterranean.74 Although these investigations 
ultimately did not reveal any misconduct, in May 2017 the committee issued 
a series of  recommendations concerning the increased regulation of  NGOs 
in order to avoid the creation of  a “humanitarian corridor” between Libya 
and Italy.75 In the same month, a Trapani court indicated it was investigating 
9bca-2b93a6856354>.
72 “Correction: Charities in the Mediterranean,” Financial Times 22 December 2016, 
<https://www.ft.com/content/eae123e2-c840-11e6-9043-7e34c07b46ef>. 
73 CINELLI, A. & SCHERER, S. “Italian court investigates whether smugglers fi nance rescue 
boats,” Reuters, 17 February 2017, <http://www.reuters.com/article/europe-migrants-
italy-ngo-idUSL8N1G24W2>; see also GOPALAKRISHNAN, M. “NGOs deny Italian lawyer’s 
accusation of  aiding traffi ckers,” Deutche Welle, 28 March 2017, <http://www.dw.com/en/
ngos-deny-italian-lawyers-accusation-of-aiding-traffi ckers/a-38154061>.
74 GRIGNETTI, F. “Ora anche il Parlamento indaga sulle navi delle Ong Mistero sui 
fi nanziamenti,” La Stampa, 24 March 2017, <http://www.lastampa.it/2017/03/24/italia/
cronache/ora-anche-il-parlamento-indaga-sulle-navi-delle-ong-mistero-sui-fi nanziamenti-
s6I9Ls9j1JoSQ5CBoTWq1I/pagina.html>.
75 BALMER, C., “Italian commission says more controls needed on aid groups rescuing 
migrants,” Reuters, 16 May 2017, <http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-europe-migrants-italy-
idUKKCN18C2DC>.
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the operations and funding of  NGOs as well as possible connection with 
smugglers.76
In July 2017, Italy released a Code of  Conduct for NGOs performing 
SAR operations in the Central Mediterranean.77 The Code outlined a number 
of  obligations to which NGOs would agree including: not entering Libyan 
territorial waters; not making communications or sending light signals that 
would function to facilitate contact with migrants smuggler and traffi ckers; not 
transferring rescued individuals to separate boats after taking them on board; 
allowing police and government offi cials to board vessels for inspections; and 
complying with other logistical requirements in terms of  communication, 
reporting and tracking with the RCC in Rome.78 The document was signed by 
some NGOs but rejected by others who suggested that it would interfere with 
their independence and would limit their ability to provide services.79 On 13 
August 2017, SOS Méditerranée signed an amended version that allowed for 
the transfer of  rescued persons and limited the ability of  police authorities to 
carry weapons onboard vessels.80
76 ZINTI, A., “Pm di Trapani: ‘Singoli membri di Ong indagati per favoreggiamento 
di immigrazione clandestine,” Repubblica, 10 May 2017, <http://www.repubblica.it/
cronaca/2017/05/10/news/il_pm_di_trapani_membri_delle_ong_indagati_per_
favoreggiamento_dell_immigrazione_clandestina_-165076853/>. Although the 
prosecutor did not announce which NGO was under investigation, reports indicated that 
it was MSF. “Report: Italy investigating MSF’s Mediterranean rescues,” Deutsche Welle, 
11May 2017, <http://www.dw.com/en/report-italy-investigating-msfs-mediterranean-
rescues/a-38797112>.  
77 “Aid groups snub Italian code of  conduct on Mediterranean rescues,” The Guardian, 31 July 
2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/31/aid-groups-snub-italian-code-
conduct-mediterranean-rescues>.
78 “Italy’s code of  conduct for NGOs involved in migrant rescue: text,” Euronews, 3 August 
2017, <http://www.euronews.com/2017/08/03/text-of-italys-code-of-conduct-for-ngos-
involved-in-migrant-rescue>.
79 Save the Children, MOAS, and Proactiva Open Arms singed the initial code of  conduct, 
while MSF, Sea-Watch, Sea-Eye, Jugend Rettet and SOS Mediterranee initially rejected it. See 
“Q&A: Why MSF didn’t sign the Code of  Conduct for Search and Rescue,” Médecins Sans 
Frontières , 2 August 2017, <http://www.msf.org/en/article/qa-why-msf-didn%E2%80%99t-
sign-code-conduct-search-and-rescue>. 
80 “SOS Mediterrranee signs amended version of  the Code of  Conduct During Meeting in 
Rome,” SOS Mediterranee, 11 August 2017, <http://sosmediterranee.org/sos-mediterranee-
signs-code-of-conduct/?lang=en>.
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Although early statements from Italian authorities indicated that a failure 
to sign the Code of  Conduct would result in NGO vessels being denied 
entry into Italian ports, as of  this writing there have been no reports of  such 
denials.81 On 2 August 2017, however, Italian authorities also seized the Jugend 
Retter vessel Iuventa in the port of  Lampedusa on suspicion that members 
of  the ship’s crew had had contacts with migrant smugglers.82 Although no 
charges have been brought, the investigation is ongoing and Jugend Rettet’s 
operations are suspended.83 On 5 August 2017, Italian prosecutors in Trapani 
confi rmed that they were investigating MSF for assisting illegal entry by 
rescuing migrants in cases where there was no immediate risk of  danger.84
This criticism of  SAR operations conducted by NGO deployers has been 
amplifi ed by Italian right-wing groups who view immigration as a challenge 
to national European ethnic identity.  In July 2017, the group Defend Europe 
acquired the vessel C-Star to deploy in the Central Mediterranean for the 
purpose of  observing and disrupting NGO deployers performing SAR 
operations.85 The vessel’s mission has been beset with diffi cult, struggling to 
pass through the Suez Canal, having crew member request asylum in Cyrus, 
losing access to crowd funding, and ultimately breaking down off  the Libyan 
coast.86
81 See “Aid groups snub Italian code of  conduct on Mediterranean rescues.”
82 “Italy impounds German NGO migrant rescue ship, lawmakers boost support for 
Libyan coastguard,” Deutsche Welle, 2 August 2017, <http://www.dw.com/en/italy-
impounds-german-ngo-migrant-rescue-ship-lawmakers-boost-support-for-libyan-
coastguard/a-39940881>. 
83 DEARDEN, L., “Italy seizes refugee rescue ship accused of  having contact with Libyan 
smugglers,” Independent, 3 August 2017, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/
europe/eu-refugee-rescue-mission-mediterranean-people-smuggling-north-africa-report-
migrant-crisis-european-a7835631.html>.
84 “Italian prosecutors widen investigation to include MSF over migrant rescues: source,” 
Reuters, 5 August 2017, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-italy-migrants-medecins-sans-
frontier-idUSKBN1AL0HZ>.
85 YORK, C., “Defend Europe Ship, The C-Star, Breaks Down in Mediterranean, NGO Sent 
to Rescue,” HUFFPOST United Kingdom, 11 August 2017, <http://www.huffi ngtonpost.
co.uk/entry/defend-europe-ship-the-c-star_uk_598d9042e4b08a247273a9a1>.
86 HOROWITZ, J., “Ship Monitoring Rescues of  Migrants Refuses to be Rescued,” The New 
York Times, 11 August 2017, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/11/world/europe/
migrant-ship-monitor-mediterranean.html>; FARRELL, J., “Defend Europe: Anti-immigrant 
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2. HARASSMENT AND EXPULSION BY LIBYA
Over the same period that Italy has shifted its rhetoric and policy towards 
NGO deployers, Libyan authorities have increased their own operations in 
the Central Mediterranean and have engaged in specifi c disruption of  NGO 
SAR operations. Although Libya has acceded to the SAR convention it has 
never established a RCC, and Italy has assumed de facto responsibility for 
monitoring its SAR region since 2013.87 Operations of  the Libyan coast guard 
resumed, however, following the establishment and recognition of  the GNA 
in early 2016 and have received signifi cant support from Italy and the EU.88
These operations have included progressive harassment and intimidation 
of  NGO vessels. In April 2016, Sea Watch reported that individuals claiming 
to be from the Libyan Coast Guard boarded its vessel and fi red shots in the 
air before leaving.89 In August 2016, MSF reported that a Libyan navy vessel 
had approached their ship Bourbon Argos, fi red at least 13 shots at the ship 
(some of  which hit the bridge), and boarded the ship for approximately 50 
minutes.90 In October 2016, the Sea-Watch said a vessel marked as Libyan 
coastguard interrupted its provision of  aid to a vessel of  150 migrants, 
which resulted in four deaths.91 On 5 May 2017, the Libyan Coast Guard 
cut across the bow of  a Sea-Watch vessel preventing it from providing aid 
to approximately 500 migrants and subsequently returning the migrants to 
ship trying to block refugees from crossing Mediterranean has funding cancelled,” 
Independent, 14 August 2017, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/defend-
europe-fi nding-patreon-refugee-boats-mediterranean-sea-c-star-migrants-right-wing-ngo-
rescue-a7891946.html>.
87 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, A Perfect Storm, at 21.
88 CUTTITTA, “Repoliticization of  Search and Rescue... cit.”, at 7.
89 “10 most tragic moments of  2016 at sea,” Sea Watch, 31 December 2016, <https://sea-
watch.org/en/10-most-tragic-moments-of-2016-at-sea/>.
90 While Libya denied boarding the vessels, it did admit to fi ring warning shots. See “Libyan 
navy admits confrontation with charity’s rescue boat,” The Guardian, 28 August 2016, 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/28/libyan-navy-admits-confrontation-
charity-rescue-boat-msf>.
91 REUTERS, “‘Libyan coastguard’ speedboat attacked migrant dinghy, says NGO,” The 
Guardian, 21 October 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/21/men-on-
libyan-coastguard-boat-reportedly-attack-dinghy-of-refugees-and-migrants>.
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Libya.92 On 8 August, ProActiva Open Arms reported that a Libyan coast 
guard vessel fi red warning shots at it while it was in international waters.93
This trend culminated on 10 August 2017, when Libyan authorities 
announced that they were establishing a national SAR zone from which they 
intended to exclude all foreign vessels, including NGO deployers.94 Although 
the statement did not specify the exact size of  the region, Italian offi cials 
supporting the establishment of  a Libyan SAR region advised NGO vessels 
to stay 60nm from the country’s shore.95 In response, Save the Children and 
Sea Eye have suspended operations, and MSF has suspended the operation 
of  its vessel Prudence although its teams continue to operate onboard the SOS 
Méditerranée vessel, Aquarius.96 Libya has indicated that it is prepared to back 
up its declaration with force, and on 16 August 2017 it temporarily detained a 
vessel operated by Proactiva Open Arms while it was 27nm from the Libyan 
coast.97
92 ELUMAMI, A., “Libyan coastguard turns back nearly 500 migrants after altercation with 
NGO ship,” 10 May 2016, Reuters, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-mi-
grants-libya-idUSKBN1862Q2>.
93 FOX, K. & D’AGOSTINO, L., “Libyan coast guard fi res warning shots as rescue boat patrols 
off  coast,” CNN, 8 August 2017, <http://edition.cnn.com/2017/08/08/europe/libya-ita-
ly-mediterranean-migrant-crisis/index.html>.  
94 YORK, C., “Libyan Navy Orders NGO Ships to Stay Out of  Mediterranean Search and 
Rescue Zone,” Huffpost United Kingdom, 11 August 2017, <http://www.huffi ngtonpost.co.uk/
entry/libyan-navy-orders-ngo-ships_uk_598d7666e4b0909642962d06,>.
95 GONZALEZ, R., “El Gobierno libio prohíbe a las ONG entrar en sus aguas,” El País, 12 August 
2017, <https://elpais.com/internacional/2017/08/11/actualidad/1502454171_609107.
html>; MARCIANO, C. & FITZPATRICK, M., “Italy applauds Libya’s decision on migrant ‘search 
and rescue’ zone,” Yahoo News, 13 August 2017, <https://www.yahoo.com/news/german-
ngo-halts-migrant-rescue-operations-off-libya-093725692.html>.
96 “Hindrance of  humanitarian assistance will create a deadly gap in the Mediterranean Sea,” 
Médecins Sans Frontières, 12 August 2017, <http://www.msf.org/en/article/hindrance-
humanitarian-assistance-will-create-deadly-gap-mediterranean-sea>.
97 SANCHEZ, R., “Libyan coastguard threatens Spanish NGO ships as tensions rise 
in Mediterranean,” The Telegraph, 16 August 2017, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
news/2017/08/16/libyan-coast-guard-threatens-spanish-ngo-ships-tensions-rise/>. 
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3. RESPONSES BY THE NGO COMMUNITY
Even before the shift in rhetoric towards NGO deployers, the human 
rights community had sought to clarify their legal status and regularize their 
operations. In September 2016, Human Rights at Sea published a report 
discussing the rights and possible liabilities for NGO deployers performing 
SAR operations.98 In February 2017, the same organization, in conjunction 
with nine other groups, released a Voluntary Code of  Conduct for NGO 
deployers stressing the principles by which they should operate and suggesting 
that the document serve as a fi rst step in an ongoing process of  developing 
comprehensive policy for NGO deployers.99
As implied criticism shifted to explicit allegations, the response by the NGO 
community has shifted in tone as well. In April 2017, Amnesty International 
released a report directly criticizing the rhetoric of  the Italian state towards 
NGO deployers.100 In June 2017, researchers at Goldsmiths and the University 
of  London published a report specifi cally refuting what it described as “toxic 
narratives” implicating NGO activity as a cause of  increased migration or as 
a contributor to shifting tactics used by smugglers.101 In July 2017, Amnesty 
International released an additional report criticizing European policies in the 
Central Mediterranean and the harassment of  vessels by Libyan authorities 
and defending the position of  NGOs.102 Human rights observers and NGO 
deployers themselves have also offered criticisms of  both the Italian Code of  
Conduct and recent actions by Libya.103
98 “Volunteer Maritime Rescuers:  Awareness of  Criminalization,” Human Rights at Sea, 
2016, (hereinafter “Volunteer Maritime Rescuers”) <https://www.humanrightsatsea.
org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/HRAS-Voluntary-Maritime-Rescuers-Awareness-of-
Criminalisation_2016-SP-LRSecured-.pdf  last accessed31>.
99 “Voluntary Code of  Conduct for Search and Rescue Operations undertaken by civil 
society Non-Governmental Organizations in the Mediterranean Sea,” Human Rights at Sea, 
2017, (hereinafter “Voluntary Code of  Conduct”) <https://www.humanrightsatsea.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/03/20170302-NGO-Code-of-Conduct-FINAL-SECURED.pdf>.
100 See Amnesty International, Italy: Losing the Moral Compass
101 See Blaming the Rescuers
102 See Amnesty International, A Perfect Storm
103 See Press Release, “Planned EU NGO Code of  Conduct threatens life-saving search 
and rescue operations,” Human Rights at Sea, 6 July 2017, <https://humanrightsatsea-news.
org/2017/07/11/updated-planned-eu-ngo-code-of-conduct-threatens-life-saving-search-
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IV. LEGAL EVALUATION OF ANTI-NGO POLICIES, CURRENT AND EXPECTED
In this context of  increasing opposition to NGO SAR operations, the 
following examines the legal implications of  the tactics already adopted by 
Libya and Italy towards NGO vessels, as well as those that have been proposed 
or that might be expected in the future.  Current actions include Libya’s 
declaration of  an exclusionary SAR zone and harassment of  NGO vessels 
and Italy’s criminal investigation of  NGO deployers for migrant traffi cking. 
Possible actions include Italy closing its ports to some or all NGOs and 
directing such vessels to return rescued individuals to North Africa.
1. LIBYA’S EXCLUSIONARY SAR ZONE
Libya’s declaration of  a SAR zone should be seen in the context of  
non-entrée strategies adopted by southern European states over the past 
twenty years to limit irregular migration.104 Although destination states have 
signifi cant interests in regulating irregular immigration, the human rights law 
principle of  non-refoulment prohibits them from returning individuals to states 
where they have a well-founded fear of  persecution.105 European states have 
and-rescue-operations/>; see also “‘Nonsensical,’ ‘Dishonest,’ ‘Illegal’: the ‘Code of  Conduct’ 
interview with Dr. Violeta Moreno-Lax,” Sea-Watch, 24 July 2017 <https://sea-watch.
org/en/nonsensical-dishonest-illegal-the-code-of-conduct/>; “Italy and Libya violate the 
‘human right to leave one’s country’,” Sea Watch, 15 August 2017, <https://sea-watch.org/
en/international-law-italy-libya/>.
104 See generally JATHAWAY, J. & GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN, T. “Non-Refoulment in a World of  
Cooperative Deterrence,” University of  Michigan Law School Law & Economics Working Papers, 
2014. CARRERA, S., “The EU Border Management Strategy: FRONTEX and the Challenges 
of  Irregular Immigration in the Canary Islands,” Centre for European Policy Studies, 1, 2007, at 
22.
105 Article 33(1) of  the 1951 Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of  Refugees 
(Refugee Convention), to which Italy is a signatory states: “No Contracting State shall expel 
or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of  territories 
where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of  his race, religion, nationality, 
membership of  a particular social group or political opinion.” Convention and Protocol Relating 
to the Status of  Refugees, UN General Assembly, 28 July 1951, United Nations, Treaty Series, 
vol. 189, <http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.html>. The principle has also been codifi ed 
in Article 19(2) of  the Charter of  Fundamental Rights of  the European Union (“No one 
may be removed, expelled or extradited to a State where there is a serious risk that he or she 
would be subjected to the death penalty, torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or 
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sought to navigate these competing interests by enlisting the assistance of  
coastal transit/departure states in controlling the exit of  migrant vessels from 
their territorial waters where those states maintain jurisdiction.106 Under these 
agreements, a destination state will provide economic support and training 
to a transit/departure state and its coast guard, and that state will control 
departure from its territorial waters through its domestic laws on maritime 
safety.107
The clearest example of  this strategy is Spain, which has implemented 
this strategy most effectively via bilateral agreements with Morocco and a 
number of  West African countries from which migrants have traditionally 
departed for the Canary Islands.108 In the mid-2000s, Italy entered into a 
similar agreement with Libya with the goal of  stopping irregular migration 
in the Central Mediterranean.109 The failure of  the Libyan state in 2011 
undermined these efforts, but the framework was explicitly resuscitated by 
the February 2017 agreement between Italy and the UN-backed Government 
of  National Accord.110 This model also serves as the basis for the EU-Turkey 
agreement reached in March 2016.111
punishment.”), and Article 3 of  the European Convention on Human Rights (“No one shall 
be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”). There is also 
broad consensus that the principle has been accepted as customary international law.  See e.g. 
FARMER, A. “Non-refoulment and Jus Cogens: Limiting Anti-Terror Measures that Threaten 
Refugee Protection,” Georgetown Immigration Law Journal, Vol. 23, 1 (2009).  
106 KILPATRICK & SMITH, at 178-82. 
107 CARRERA, at 21.
108 See KILPATRICK & SMITH, op. cit., at 178-82.
109 GIUFFRE, M., “State Responsibility Beyond Borders: What Legal Basis for Italy’s Push-
Backs to Libya?”, 24(4) International Journal of  Refugee Law, 2012, at 692. 
110 EL-GAMATY, G., “Italy and France are playing a dangerous game in Libya,” Aljazeera, 
21 August 2017, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/08/italy-
france-playing-dangerous-game-libya-170815105230759.html>; full text of  agreement 
available at <http://www.asgi.it/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/ITALY-LIBYA-
MEMORANDUM-02.02.2017.pdf>.
111 See Eur. Commission, EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan, 16 October 2015, <http://europa.
eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-5860_en.htm> (on interests underlying EU-Turkey 
negotiations); See also EU-Turkey Statement, Council of  the European Union, March 18, 
2016, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18-eu-turkey-
statement/>.
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Libya’s declaration of  an exclusionary SAR zone represents a departure 
from previous practice of  allowing NGO vessels, along with Italian state 
vessels and sovereign vessels operating within EUNAVFORMED, to operate 
in the area outside its territorial waters.112 When announcing the exclusionary 
zone, Libyan authorities stated that they wished to make it clear that such a 
zone was an extension of  Libyan sovereignty and would be patrolled by its 
coast guard and navy.113 NGO deployers have taken those statements to be 
threats of  violence especially in the context of  recent acts of  aggression by 
the Libyan coast guard including the detention of  an NGO vessel it claimed 
was inside its territorial waters.114
Italian authorities appear to have perceived the statement as threatening 
violence as well. Although the announcement did not specify the dimensions 
of  the declared SAR region, representatives from MSF reported that Italian 
authorities had advised them to remain at least 60nm from the Libyan coast.115 
The government also has been supportive of  the declaration. On 13 August 
2017, Italy’s Foreign Minister stated that the move indicated “balance was 
being restored in the Mediterranean.”116
Although a coastal state exercising national authority to restrict the exit of  
irregular migrants is itself  not illegal, an exclusionary zone of  the size claimed 
by Libya is completely inconsistent with applicable international law, and as 
of  this writing Libya has provided no legal justifi cation for its claim. Under 
UNCLOS, a coastal state can claim a region up to 12nm from its established 
baseline as its territorial seas over which its sovereignty extends.117 Although 
112 GONZALEZ. Libya fi rst negotiated the dimensions of  its SAR region with Malta in 2009, as 
part of  a plan to initiate joint patrols with Italy within its territorial waters to combat irregular 
migration. AMEEN, J., Libya fi nally declares search and rescue area,” Times of  Malta, 22 
March 2009, <https://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20090322/local/libya-fi nally-
declares-search-and-rescue-area.249830>.
113 GONZALEZ, loc. cit.
114 “Hindrance of  humanitarian assistance will create a deadly gap in the Mediterranean 
Sea,” Medecins Sans Frontieres, 12 August 2017 <http://www.msf.org/en/article/hindrance-
humanitarian-assistance-will-create-deadly-gap-mediterranean-sea>; “Libyan Coastguards 
kidnapped Rescueboat of  Spanish NGO,” Sea Watch, 21 August 2017 <https://sea-watch.
org/en/breaking-news-der-woche>.
115 Idem.
116 MARCIANO & FITZPATRICK, loc. cit.
117 UNCLOS, Art. 2
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foreign vessels are generally allowed to enter territorial seas under the right of  
“innocent passage,” UNCLOS provides states broad latitude to exclude vessels 
where passage is determined not to be innocent.118 UNCLOS specifi cally 
mentions “the loading or unloading of  any commodity, currency or person 
contrary to the customs, fi scal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations 
of  the coastal State” as conduct not constituting innocent passage.119 As such, 
within 12nm of  Libya’s coast, it would likely be permissible for Libya to 
exclude NGO deployers.120
In the 12nm band adjacent to its territorial waters, Libya might also be 
able to justify engagement with NGO vessels, although under a different 
basis. UNCLOS classifi es this region as a coastal state’s contiguous zone and 
provides that the state may “exercise control necessary… to prevent [and 
punish] infringement of… customs, fi scal, immigration or sanitary laws and 
regulations within its territory or territorial sea.”121 As such, should Libyan 
authorities suspect an NGO deployer of  intending to violate domestic law 
upon arrival in its territorial seas, they might arguably be able to take action 
to exclude it from the contiguous zone.
Beyond the contiguous zone, however, a state has extremely limited 
authority to prohibit the passage of  a vessel. The right of  “hot pursuit” allows 
state vessels to follow vessels beyond the contiguous zone but applies only in 
cases where a vessel has already violated its laws and pursuit has begun—not 
as a preventative measure.122  UNCLOS also provides for a “right of  visit” 
of  stateless vessels and vessels suspected of  piracy, participating in the slave 
118 UNCLOS, Art. 19
119 Idem.
120 It has generally been the policy of  NGOs and state actors providing SAR services to operate 
further than 12nm from Libya’s coast, and with very limited exceptions, all SAR events in the 
Central Mediterranean have occurred beyond the 12nm line which separates territorial waters 
from international waters. Irregular Migration via the Central Mediterranean. Representatives 
from Proactiva Open Arms whom Libyan offi cials accused of  having entered their territorial 
waters, defended their actions on the ground that they were beyond 12nm rom the Libyan 
coast.  FOX & D’AGOSTINO. See also, video posted via Twitter by ProActiva Open Arms, 
“Sucedó ayer 8:30am en aguas internacionales. Patrullera guardacostas Libios, formados y 
fi nanciados #UE, amenaza y dispara #OpenArms. 8 August 2017, <https://twitter.com/
openarms_fund/status/894835757675933697>.
121 UNCLOS, Art. 33
122 UNCLOS, Art. 111.
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trade, and certain unauthorized broadcasting, but none of  those conditions 
would apply to an NGO conducting SAR operations.123 Even the expansion 
of  the right of  visit via UNSCR 2240 and UNSCR 2312 only allow Libyan 
authorities to board an NGO vessel it suspected of  human smuggling—not 
exclude such a vessel from an area of  international waters.124 As such there is 
simply no legal basis for the wholesale exclusion of  NGO vessels from any 
area outside the contiguous zone.
2. ITALIAN CRIMINAL PROSECUTION OF NGOS
The seizure of  the Jugend Rettet vessel and the announcement of  an 
investigation of  MSF personnel in Trapani—both less than a week before 
Libya’s declaration of  its exclusionary SAR zone—raise the possibility of  
criminal prosecution of  NGO deployers. Although as of  this writing, no 
charges have been brought in either case, it is important to note that Italian 
criminal law provides broad basis for prosecution for assisting illegal entry 
and a conviction could result in stiff  penalties.  Any evidence that an NGO 
had in fact coordinated with migrant smugglers would make a conviction sig-
nifi cantly more likely, and prosecution would likely be fi nancially devastating 
to the NGO even in the case an acquittal.
Italian domestic legislation provides for prosecution of  anyone who acts 
to “promote, manage, organize, fi nance or carry out the transportation of  
aliens in the territory of  the State or commits other acts in order to produce 
their illegal entry in the territory of  the State.”125 This crime is punishable by 
in imprisonment from one to fi ve years and a fi ne of  15,000 euros for each 
person smuggled.126 Performing such acts for the purpose of  direct or indi-
rect profi t constitutes aggravating circumstances which increase the prison 
123 UNCLOS  Art. 110.
124 UNSCR 2240(2015) and UNSCR 2312(2016).  See Meetings Coverage, “Adopting 
Resolution 2312 (2016), Security Council Extends Authorization to Intercept vessels 
Suspected of  Illegal Smuggling from Libya,” United Nations, 6 October 2016, <https://
www.un.org/press/en/2016/sc12543.doc.htm>.
125 Decreto Legislativo 286/1998 Art 12(1); translation found in RAGAZZI, S., “Europe’s Cri-
sis: What future for immigration and asylum law and policy?” delivered at 2016 Migration and 
Law Network Conference, 27 June 2016.  
126 See Id.
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time to fi ve to fi fteen years.127 The law provides for no express exception for 
humanitarian actions.128
The principle historical example of  state prosecution of  NGO deployers 
is the Cap Anamur case, which arose out of  events that occurred in 2004 
and was ultimately decided by an Italian court in Agrigento, Sicily in 2009.129 
There, the vessel Cap Anamur (belonging to a German NGO of  the same 
name), while conducting “rescue and support” activities in Mediterranean, 
encountered a vessel with 37 migrants, the majority of  whom claimed to be 
from Sudan which at the time was undergoing a civil war.130 Given the condi-
tion of  the vessel, the ship embarked all persons onboard and attempted to 
transport them to the nearest place of  safety, Porto Empedocle, Sicily.131 The 
Italian government denied the vessel entry claiming that Malta should take 
responsibility for disembarking the passengers since the rescue occurred in 
the Maltese SAR region.132
After eight days at sea, the vessel ultimately entered the Porto Empedocle 
where it was immediately seized by Italian authorities who seized the ship, 
arrested the crew and transferred the 37 migrants to immigration detention 
127 See Id.
128 PROVERA, M., “The Criminalisation of  Irregular Migration in the European Union,” Liberty 
and Security, No. 80 (February 2015), 40 (discussing domestic legislation of  European states 
regarding assistance to irregular migrants.).
129 See e.g. CUTTITTA, P., “From the CAP ANAMUR to MARE NOSTRUM: Humanitarianism 
and Migration Controls at the EU’s Maritime Borders, Cleer Working Papers (2014) (hereinafter 
“CUTTITTA, From the CAP ANAMUR to MARE NOSTRUM”) 7; BASARAN, T., “Saving 
Lives at Sea: Security, Law and Adverse Effects,” European Journal of  Migration and Law 16 (2014), 
(hereinafter “BASRAN, Saving Lives at Sea”); BASARAN, T., “The saved and the drowned: 
Governing indifference in the name of  security,” Security Dialogue 1-16 (2015), (hereinafter 
“BASRAN, The Saved and the Drowned”) 7; PIERLUIGI U., “Is it a crime to help people to 
survive?  Cap Anamur and other cases” Speech made at Migrants- Outlaws Everywhere/The 
Alien as an Enemy? Homeless, Excluded.  4 May 2013, text available at <http://www.eldh.
eu/fi leadmin/user_upload/ejdm/publications/2013/Pierluigi_Umbriano_-_Speech.pdf>.  
130 Id.  
131 Case N. 3267/04 R.G.N.R. <https://www.unodc.org/cld/case-law-
d o c / m i g r a n t s m u g g l i n g c r i m e t y p e / i t a / 2 0 0 9 / c a s e _ n . _ 3 2 6 7 0 4 _ r . g . n . r . .
html?lng=en&tmpl=sherloc>.
132 Ibidem.
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facility.133  Chargers were brought against the shipmaster, the fi rst offi cer of  
the vessel, and the CEO of  the Cap Anamur organization for assisting illegal 
entry with the aggravating fact of  doing so to procure a profi t.134  At trial, the 
Italian prosecutors argued that the aggravating element was satisfi ed since 
the Cap Anamur had conducted the rescue with the intent to procure a profi t 
via “advertising and international publicity obtained in the sale of  third-party 
images and information relative to the facts of  the process.”135
Ultimately, the court acquitted the defendants.136 Italian law provides for 
an exclusion of  criminal responsibility for cases where otherwise criminal 
action is committed through the performance of  a duty imposed by law.137 
The court found that the obligations enshrined in international law and the 
Italian Code of  Navigation obligated the vessel to take the migrants on board 
and effectuate their transfer to a place of  safety, and as such found that de-
fendants had committed no criminal act.138
Should the members of  the Jugend Rettet of  MSF be taken to trial, they 
would likely argue that their activities as part of  SAR operations were also 
driven by a duty imposed by law and point to the Cap Anamur case as prece-
dent. To support this position further they might look to a recent series of  
Italian prosecutions of  organized criminal smuggling networks which have 
emphasized the strength of  obligation to rescue under Italian law.139 In these 
cases—prosecuting the heads of  smuggling networks who are themselves 
located outside of  Italian territory—Italian courts have found that the mere 
133 BASARAN: “Saving Lives at Sea... cit.”, at 374-8.
134 CUTTITTA, “From the CAP ANAMUR to MARE NOSTRUM... cit.”, at 22-23. See C.P. 
Article 110, D.L. 286/1998, Article 12(1), 12(3).
135 BASARAN, “Saving Lives at Sea... cit.”, at 375.
136 Ibidem. at 376.
137 Ibidem. at 377-78.
138 Case N. 3267/04 R.G.N.R... cit.
139 RAGAZZI, at 5. See also Judgment N. 18354/14- Italian Supreme Court, 3 November 
2014, <https://www.unodc.org/cld/case-law-doc/criminalgroupcrimetype/ita/2014/
judgment_n._1835414_-_supreme_court.html?lng=en&tmpl=sherloc>; Proc. n. 
292/2015 R.I.M.C., 3 March 2015, <https://www.unodc.org/cld/case-law-doc/
criminalgroupcrimetype/ita/2015/proc._n._2922015_r.i.m.c._-_appeal_against_order_of_
precautionary_detention_.html?lng=en&tmpl=sherloc>; Proc. N. 675/2016 R.I.M.C. 4 
November 2016, <https://www.unodc.org/cld/case-law- doc/migrantsmugglingcrimetype/
ita/2016/proc._nr_6752016_r.i.m.c..html?lng=en&tmpl=sherloc.>
Uncertainty, Alert and Distress: The Precarious Position of  NGO Search and Rescue Operations in the Central 
Mediterranean
Paix et Securité Internationales
ISSN 2341-0868, Num. 5, janvier-décembre 2017, pp. 29-7058
act of  directing a migrant vessel toward Italian waters can trigger criminal 
liability under the anti-smuggling statute since the criminal act of  transport 
to Italy is completed by actors who are bound by recognized national and 
international obligations.140
Notwithstanding these arguments, a prosecution may be able distinguish 
the Cap Anamur case from recent NGO practice. First, the Cap Anamur act of  
rescue occurred while the vessel was en route to deliver supplies to the Midd-
le East rather than explicitly conducting SAR activities at the edge of  Libya 
territorial waters, as has been the general practice of  NGOs.141 Additionally, in 
the Cap Anamur case the court noted the specifi c weather concerns that made 
the vessel particularly unsafe at the time of  rescue.142 Although the current 
vessels used by migrants are unquestionably precarious, it is unclear whether 
a court would view them with the same degree of  emergency absent acute 
weather conditions or other sources of  alarm.  Most importantly, however, 
evidence that an NGO vessel had coordinated its operations with migrant 
smugglers would likely undermine a defense that the NGO was acting as a 
result of  legal obligation.143
A conviction would likely result in signifi cant penalties given the presence 
of  aggravating factors.  Just as in the Cap Anamur case, the prosecution could 
argue that the rescue was performed for the purpose of  direct or indirect 
profi t through the form of  publicity.  Although the court in the Cap Anamur 
case acquitted the defendants, it looked favorably on the argument that the 
term “profi t” should be interpreted broadly and speculated that publicity re-
ceived from the rescue including media attention could fall within the scope 
140 Id.
141 Case N. 32/04 R.G.N.R., cit.
142 Id.
143 Italian C.P. Art. 54 provides the humanitarian exception on which the court on the Cap 
Anamur relied and reads: “Anyone who has committed an act having been compelled to 
do so by the necessity of  saving himself  or others from the risk of  an imminent personal 
injury, that was not voluntarily caused, nor otherwise avoidable … (shall not be punished for 
that conduct)… as long as the action is proportional to the danger.” Translation in BASRAN, 
“Saving Lives at Sea... cit.”, at 377-78. Evidence of  collaboration with migrant smugglers 
would undermine such a defense on the theory that the danger was voluntarily caused and 
avoidable.  See ZINITI, (detailing statements by Italian prosecutor on relationship between 
humanitarian exception and migrant facilitation).
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of  fi nancial or material gain suffi cient to trigger this factor.144 Jugend Rettet 
and MSF, like all NGO performing SAR operations, are funded primarily 
through donations and use traditional and social medial coverage of  their 
activities to raise funds.145 As such, there is little doubt this aggravating factor 
could be established in case of  a conviction.
Even if  prosecution were unsuccessful, the cost of  defending could be 
crippling to Jugend Rettet, MSF or any other NGO against which charges 
were brought. Although the defendants in the Cap Anamur case were ultima-
tely acquitted, defending the case imposed enormous fi nancial costs on the 
organization and led to the resignation of  the CEO and the dissolution of  
the organization.146 Following the announcement of  the verdict in October 
2009, the captain of  the vessel stated, “if  seafarers at sea notice a refugee 
boat, they know that we stood trial for three years. The acquittal then perhaps 
does not play an important role anymore.”147
Indeed, the Cap Anamur prosecution appears to have been intended in 
part to serve as a warning to NGO deployers not to assist in the transport of  
migrants to Italy.148  The prosecutor of  the case stated explicitly that the de-
cision to prosecute was driven by both legal and political considerations so as 
to “avoid the repetition of  these kinds of  actions, even if  they happen due to 
a noble purpose.”149 It and other prosecutions from the time period appear to 
have successfully deterred NGO SAR activity in the Central Mediterranean 
from 2004 until 2014.150 In a description of  the internal debate undertaken 
144 Id. 
145 See “FAQs: Why Do we Accept Private Donations Only?” Jugend Rettet, 2017, <https://
jugendrettet.org/en/>; “Donate,” Médecins Sans Frontières , 2017, <http://www.msf.org/
en/donate>.
146 BASARAN, “The Saved and the Drowned... cit”. at 7
147 Id.
148 Id. at 8; “Italy’s Refugee Policies Should Be Put on Trial,” Spiegel Online, 8 Oct 2009, 
<http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/the-world-from-berlin-italy-s-refugee-
policies-should-be-put-on-trial-a-653989.html>
149 BASARAN, “The Saved and the Drowned... cit.”, at 8.
150 The other signifi cant case related to human smuggling under Italian law is Morthada and 
El-Hedi in which seven Tunisian fi shermen were prosecuted under Italian anti-smuggling 
statute after taking onboard 44 individuals they had rescued from a shipwreck near Lampe-
dusa and transporting them to that port. Although the crew was acquitted at trial, the ship 
captains were initially convicted and sentenced to imprisonment of  2 years and 6 months in 
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before beginning its own SAR operations in 2015, the Head of  Advocacy and 
Operational Communications for MSF directly cited the Cap Anamur case 
as a reason why the organization did not begin SAR operations when they 
were “fi rst proposed in 2011.151  In much the same way, it may be that recent 
actions by Italian authorities towards Jugend Rettet and MSF are intended to 
serve as deterrents to other NGOs.
3. LIMITING NGOS ACCESS TO ITALIAN PORTS
Although as of  this writing, Italy has not refused access to its ports to 
any NGO vessels that have recovered migrants, such exclusions may be for-
thcoming.  In late June 2017, following a spike in migrant arrivals to Italy, the 
Italian government indicated that it was considering closing its ports to NGO 
vessels or such vessels not fl ying Italian fl ags.152 Since the introduction of  its 
Code of  Conduct in late July 2017, similar suggestions have been raised that 
Italy could limit access to its ports to only those NGOs who have signed the 
code.153 The following discusses the central legal issues involved in such a 
policy shift:  the obligations to disembark rescued migrants, a state’s duty to 
identify a “place of  safety” rescued individuals, and the relationship between 
that responsibility and the obligation of  non-refoulment.
addition to signifi cant fi nes.  Two years later, those convictions were ultimately overturned 
on appeal. See BASARAN, “The Saved and the Drowned... cit.” at 7.
151 According to that account, the fundamental change occurred with the launch of  Mare 
Nostrum and the deployment of  the MOAS. See DEL VALLE, H., “Search and Rescue in the 
Mediterranean Sea:  Negotiating Political Differences,” Refugee Survey Quarterly, 2016, 35, 22-
40, 26. See also, CUTTITTA at 8 (arguing that Mare Nostrum shifted away from a previous policy 
of  state opposition to private SAR actions even by commercial vessels). 
152 WINTOUR, P., “Italy considers closing its ports to boats carrying migrants,” 28 June 2017, 
The Guardian, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/28/italy-considers-closing-
its-ports-to-ships-from-libya>; MCMAHON, S., “Italy’s bluff  to close its ports to migrant 
boats heightens tensions in the Mediterranean,” 4 July 2017, The Conversation, <http://
theconversation.com/italys-bluff-to-close-its-ports-to-migrant-boats-heightens-tensions-in-
the-mediterranean-80428>.
153 “Another NGO Signs Italy’s Rules,” Suryaa/IANS, 11 August 2017, <https://www.
suryaa.com/16583-another-ngo-signs-italys-rules.html>.
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A. Obligation to Disembark
As discussed above, under the SAR convention, coastal states are required 
to establish a SAR region, promote the establishment of  SAR services within 
that region, render assistance to vessels in distress, and coordinate the disem-
barkation of  rescued individuals in a “place of  safety.”154 These obligations do 
not, however, clearly include an affi rmative duty to accept rescued individuals 
within national territory.155 The 2004 IMO Guidelines indicate that such a 
duty may exist in cases where no other state has provided a port of  disem-
barkation, but this is not settled.156 On one hand, the text tends to support the 
presence of  such a duty by stating: “the responsibility to provide a place of  
safety, or to ensure that a place of  safety is provided, falls on the Government 
responsible for the SAR region in which the survivors were recovered.”157 On 
the other hand, the Annex to the document re-affi rms a state’s sovereignty 
and its ability to “control its borders [and] exclude aliens from its territory” 
which would be inconsistent with a duty to disembark.158 If  such a duty exists, 
it is not widely recognized.159
Even if  Italy were to assert that it has no obligation to disembark indivi-
duals rescued in its SAR region, 160 it might still be required to accept NGO 
154 SAR Convention, at 6.1-6.11.
155 PAPASTAVRIDIS, loc. cit., at 20.
156 GALLAGHER & DAVID, at 460.
157 2004 IMO Guidelines, at 2.5.
158 2004 IMO Guidelines at Annex par. 5. See COPPENS, loc. cit. (arguing that 2004 IMO Guide-
lines language at 2.5 establish an obligation to disembark if  no other state can be found for 
disembarkation).
159 Indeed the fact that IMO Facilitation Committee drafted language to clarify this particu-
lar point and that such language was not accepted serves to underscore this uncertainty. See 
GALLAGHER & DAVID, loc. cit. at 460; DI FILIPPO, loc. cit. at 70. 
160 Ironically, it may be diffi cult for Italy to assert the conservative position on the duty to 
disembark, since it has asserted that such an obligation does exist in disputes with Malta. 
Malta’s SAR region is extensive and includes areas that are geographically closer to Italian 
ports than to its own. When SAR incidents occur in those regions, Italy has argued that Malta 
has responsibility to accept disembarkation under the 2004 Guidelines.  Malta, however, does 
not accept the guidelines and has asserted that Italy should accept disembarkation as the 
“next port of  call.” Parliamentary Assembly, Report Doc. 12628 The interception and rescue 
at sea of  asylum seekers, refugees and migrants, <http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/
Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fi leid=13141&lang=en>.
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vessels into its ports if  such vessels can establish that they are forced to enter 
because of  distress or force majeure. The traditional right to enter a port in ca-
ses of  distress has changed signifi cantly over time and is currently is interpre-
ted as only existing in cases to protect human life.161  In the Cap Anamur case, 
for instance, Italy permitted the entrance of  the migrants only after the ship 
declared that the lives of  those on board was in real danger due to precarious 
conditions and a possible revolt by the migrants.162 Similarly, Italy’s decision 
to ultimately let the MV Salamis disembark 102 rescued Somali migrants at 
Lampedusa was driven in part by the presence of  four pregnant women and 
a fi ve-month old baby.163 Such conditions are not always present however, and 
in the wake of  the current shift of  Italian policy, it is unreasonable to count 
on this humanitarian exception as a basis for entry. 
B. Obligation to Delivery to a “Place of Safety”
Regardless of  whether Italy recognizes an obligation to disembark, it re-
mains be obligated to coordinate the transport of  any individuals rescued in 
its SAR region to a “place of  safety.” As no other European state is likely to 
accept disembarkation of  rescued individuals, the most probable prospects 
would be ports in Libya, and reports about current conditions tend to suggest 
that at this time it cannot be reasonably considered a “place of  safety” for 
purposes of  SAR return.164 That said, the express commitments made by Italy 
and the EU to improve migrant reception conditions in Libya indicate that 
161 MORRISON, A., “Shelter from the Storm—the problem of  places of  refuge for ships in 
distress and proposals to remedy the problem,” University of  Wollongong Thesis Collection, 
(2011), <http://ro.uow.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4218&context=theses>.
162 Case N. 32/04 R.G.N.R.
163 MALLIA, P. “The MV Salamis and the State of  Disembarkation at International Law: The 
Undefi nable Goal,” American Society of  International Law, 13(11), 15 May 2014, <https://www.
asil.org/insights/volume/18/issue/11/mv-salamis-and-state-disembarkation-international-
law-undefi nable-goal#_ednref14>; “Italy accepts migrants rejected by Malta,” Aljazeera, 8 
August 2013, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2013/08/20138813638173281.
html>.
164 See e.g. Statement of  ICC Prosecutor to the UNSC on the Situation in Libya,” International 
Criminal Court, 9 May 2017, (stating that the security situation has deteriorated in previous 6 
months and that the country is at risk of  returning to widespread confl ict) <https://www.
icc-cpi.int/legalAidConsultations?name=170509-otp-stat-lib>.
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the foundation is being laid to have Libya—or at least individuals ports within 
Libya—determined to be a possible destination for migrants rescued at sea.165
Establishing Libyan ports as a “place of  safety” and directing NGOs to 
deposit migrant vessels there might also provide Italy another mechanism be-
sides the Libyan coast guard to evade its obligations of  non-refoulment. The in-
ternational human rights law principle of  non-refoulment prohibits states from 
returning individuals to the borders of  territories where they may face perse-
cution or violence.166  This principle was applied to the context of  maritime 
rescue in the seminal 2012 case of  Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy before the Eu-
ropean Court of  Human Rights, arising from an incident concerning a vessel 
of  the Italian Navy engaging a migrant vessel on the high seas and returning 
the migrants onboard to Libya.167 The court held that because state authori-
ties had exercised “continuous and exclusive control” over the migrants, Italy 
was required to take affi rmative steps to determine whether those individuals’ 
rights would be violated upon their return to Libya.168
165 Perhaps most tellingly, the human rights community has responded to the Libya-Italy 
agreement by stressing that Libya should not be considered a place of  safety.  On 2 February 
2017, following the announcement of  the Libya-Italy agreement, the UNHCR and the IOM 
issued a joint statement highlighting abuses suffered by migrants in Italy and stressing that 
Italy should not be considered a safe country for return of  migrants. The following day the 
MSF issued a similar statement stressing the abuse of  migrants and the dangers they face 
on return. The report by Amnesty International regarding innuendo against NGOs also 
stresses that Libya is not safe. These emphatic denials may be perhaps the best evidence 
for legitimate concern.  See “Joint UNHCR and IOM statement on addressing migration 
and refugee movements along the Central Mediterranean route,” UNCHR, 2 Februar 2017, 
<http://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2017/2/58931ffb4/joint-unhcr-iom-statement-
addressing-migration-refugee-movements-along.html>; “MSF warns EU about inhumane 
approach to migration as leaders meet to discuss cooperation with Libya,” Médecins Sans 
Frontières, 3 February 2017, <https://prezly.msf.org.uk/msf-warns-eu-about-inhumane-
approach-to-migration-management-as-leaders-meet-today-to-discuss-cooperation-with-
libya#>; Amnesty International, “Italy: Losing the Moral Compass.”
166 See Refugee Convention, Art. 33(1) 
167 See Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, App. No. 27765/09 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 23, 2012)(hereinafter “Hirsi 
Jamaa” (holding that Italy could not lawfully return Somali and Eritrean nationals to the coast 
of  Libya without granting the opportunity to challenge their forced return by seeking inter-
national refugee protection); (For a succinct summary of  this decision see David P. STEWART, 
International Decision: Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, 107 A.J.I.L. 417 (2013))
168 Id., at paragraphs 77, 133. 
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Italy might argue, then, that these non-refoulment obligations apply only 
when states establish this control.  In Hirsi, the court pointed to the rescue 
occurring on a military ship crewed entirely by military personnel and found 
that the state had established both de jure and de facto control over the mi-
grants.169  The same would not be true in the case of  an NGO deployer ren-
dering assistance and coordinating disembarkation with the responsible RCC 
as the SAR convention does not limit the freedom of  navigation otherwise 
enjoyed by the rescuing master.170 Italy would argue that because a non-state 
actor (the NGO rather than by a sovereign vessel) performed the rescue, it 
was bound only by the requirement to ensure that the rescued individual was 
delivered to a “place of  safety,” not by the broader principle of  non-refoulment.
In practice, the differences between these two obligations could allow 
states to return migrants via NGO vessels to places they couldn’t return them 
via state vessels.  Importantly, there are substantive differences between the 
standards for a “place of  safety” laid out in the SAR Convention and the 
principle of  non-refoulment.  Under the 2004 Guidelines, a place of  safety is 
defi ned as “a place where the survivors’ safety of  life is no longer threatened 
and where their basic human needs (such as food, shelter and medical needs) 
can be met.”  The emphasis on safety of  life and basic human needs makes 
the standard much easier to satisfy than the more comprehensive standards 
that constitute the principle of  non-refoulment.171  It is not diffi cult to imagine 
a situation in which an individual could have a well-founded fear of  perse-
cution in a place where their safety of  life is not threatened and where their 
basic needs have been met.172
169 Id. at paragraph 81.
170 See SAR Convention Article 2. The actual authority of  the RCC is somewhat distorted by 
common practice. Private masters are often motivated to disembark rescued individuals as 
quickly as possible to control the signifi cant economic cost of  delay due to rescue, and so 
the RCC’s determination of  a point of  disembarkation may appear to control the master’s 
action. Likewise, Italy’s policy of  accepting the disembarkation of  all migrants rescued in the 
Central Mediterranean since 2013 has also given NGO deployers little cause to question the 
selection of  a specifi c port of  disembarkation. In cases of  dispute, however, as in the MV 
Salamis incident, shipmasters have not hesitated to refuse the direction of  RCCs. 
171 See DI FILIPPO, loc. cit., at 65.
172 Additionally, the principle of  non-refoulment may provide broader geographic protections 
than a “place of  safety” under the SAR Convention. The Refugee Convention prohibits re-
turn of  individuals “to the frontiers of  a territory” of  a person who has a well-founded fear 
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Some observers have argued that there is not a substantive difference 
between the two standards and point to the language of  the 2004 Guidelines 
as seeking to incorporate the principle of  non-refoulment.173 While the 2004 
Guidelines do refer to the principles of  non-refoulment, the language is weake-
ned considerably and imposes no affi rmative obligation to ensure refugees 
are not returned to a place where they fear persecution.174 Moreover, the SAR 
framework as a whole provides no mechanism for shipmasters to commu-
nicate information about the risk of  abuse or fear of  persecution a rescued 
person might face to the RCC. In laying out the obligations of  coastal states, 
the 2004 Guidelines list a specifi c set of  information that the RCC should 
seek to obtain from masters of  rescuing ships but makes no reference to any 
information about refugee status or intention to seek asylum.175 Likewise the 
directions provided to shipmasters include no suggestion that rescued per-
sons be asked about their fear to return to a particular place.176
This distinction between procedural responsibilities in cases of  rescue by 
state actors versus cases of  rescue by non-state actors has been reinforced 
since the beginning of  the current crisis.  In 2015, the International Chamber 
of  Shipping produced the second edition of  its publication, “Large Scale 
Rescue Operations at Sea: Guidance on Ensuring Safety and Security of  Se-
afarers and Rescued Persons” which explicitly disclaims any responsibility 
on the part of  private masters concerning “listening to, acting upon or com-
municating information concerning the legal status of  rescued persons or 
of  persecution, and the European Convention prohibits return to a State. No such language 
is present in the defi nition of  a “place of  safety.”  As such, a single city or port could argu-
able constitute a “place of  safety” even if  it were located within a country or territory where 
an individual would otherwise face persecution or other risks. This concern may be most 
acute in the current context given the political divisions in Libya today. Refugee Convention, 
Art. 33(1); “Why is Libya so lawless?” BBC, 25 May 2017, <at http://www.bbc.com/news/
world-africa-24472322>.
173 COPPENS, loc. cit. at 39.
174 2004 IMO Guidelines at 6.17:  “The need to avoid disembarkation in territories where 
the lives and freedoms of  those alleging a well-founded fear of  persecution would be threat-
ened is a consideration in the case of  asylum-seekers and refugees recovered at sea.” See DI 
FILIPPO, loc. cit. at 64.
175 See 2004 IMO Guidelines, at 6.10
176 See 2004 IMO Guidelines, at 5.1
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applications for asylum.”177 It concludes, “the Master has no responsibility for 
determining the status of  those rescued.”178
Additionally, neither of  the primary policy documents produced by the 
NGO community have sought to assert any right or responsibility on the 
part of  the NGO to assess rescued migrants for their status as refugees or 
asylum seekers. The Human Rights at Sea guide to Volunteer Maritime Res-
cuers mentions the principle of  non-refoulment as it pertains to states but does 
not indicate any way its obligations can be incorporated into the NGOs’ 
operations.179 Similarly Human Rights at Sea’s Voluntary Code of  Conduct 
references an individual’s right to seek asylum, but provides no framework 
for NGOs to facilitate that process.180
Italy could conceivably exploit this gap between its obligations when state 
vessels rescue migrants and its obligations when private actors perform the 
rescue.  Once Libya—or any port therein—were determined to be a “place 
of  safety,” the Italian RCC could direct NGO deployers to return rescued 
migrants there without having to conduct any evaluation into their refugee 
status and regardless of  whether they had a well-founded fear of  persecu-
tion.  Such a model—coupled with an active Libyan coast guard patrolling 
its greater SAR region—would effectively externalize the European border 
to an even a greater degree than has been achieved in either the Western or 
Eastern Mediterranean.
As of  this writing, all NGO deployers performing SAR operations in the 
Central Mediterranean are closely aligned with the international human rights 
community, and there is no evidence to suggest that they would allow them-
selves to be used by state actors to effectuate a policy of  return. Indeed, an 
NGO that was refused entry in Italy and directed to return rescued migrants 
to Libya would be within its rights to refuse, as was the case with the MV 
Salamis.181  At the same time, a different non-state actor that supported an 
Italian policy of  push-backs might be very willing to effectuate such returns.
177 International Chamber of  Shipping, at 3.
178 Id.
179 Volunteer Maritime Rescuers, at 9.
180 Voluntary Code of  Conduct, at 11.
181 Italy accepts migrants rejected by Malta,” Aljazeera, 8 August 2013, <http://www.aljazeera.
com/news/europe/2013/08/20138813638173281.html>.
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C. Possible Italian Liability for Return by Private Actors
Should Italy seek to implement a program of  pushbacks via complicit 
NGOs, it might nonetheless face liability under the theory that the vessel 
was acting as an agent of  the state, but this is uncertain.  Article 8 of  the UN 
Resolution on the Responsibility of  States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 
provides that the conduct of  a person or group may be attributed to a state 
if  the person or group is acting under the state’s instructions, direction and 
control.182 In the case Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, the International Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia in explaining the doctrine of  state liability for actions 
by private actors stated: “The rationale behind this rule is to prevent States 
from escaping international responsibility by having private individuals carry 
out tasks that may not or should not be performed by the state.”183 In appl-
ying Article 8, international tribunals look the degree of  overall control im-
posed by the state actor over the actions of  the private actors in determining 
state responsibility.184 In the Nicaragua case, the United States was found to 
not have responsibility for specifi c acts of  the contras that it had not direc-
ted even though it had fi nanced, organized, trained the group and assisted 
in identifying other military targets.185 In the Rajic case, however, the court 
looked to overall control over the organization as the determining factor.186
Whether suffi cient control could be established would be a fact-specifi c 
inquiry, and a fi nding of  responsibility is not certain.187 Given the authority 
182 ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of  States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, UN Doc 
A/56/10 (2001), Art. 8.
183 International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber, Prosecutor v. Duško 
Tadić, Opinion and Judgement, Case No. IT-94-1-T, 7 May 1997
184 Cited in “Report of  the Secretary-General, Responsibility of  States for internationally 
wrongful acts, compilation of  decisions of  international courts, tribunals and other bodies” 
United Nations General Assembly, A/62/62, 1 February 2007, <http://www.un.org/ga/
search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/62/62>, at 35-37.
185 Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. Rep, <http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.
asp?symbol=A/62/62>, at 35-37
186 International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber, Prosecutor v. Ivica Rajić 
(“Stupni Do”), Review of  the Indictment pursuant to Rule 61 of  the Rules of  Procedure and 
Evidence, Case No. IT-95-12-R61, 13 September 1996, paras. 24-25.
187 But see PAPASTAVRIDIS, loc. cit., at 39 (asserting that responsibility under Article 8 could read-
ily be established under these circumstances).
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retained by masters to refuse to follow the direction of  the RCC and the fact 
that the coastal state is required to coordinate disembarkation, an isolated act 
might not be suffi cient trigger responsibility for a state. Additionally, it might 
be possible to argue that state criminal responsibility cannot exist because 
the underlying act of  the master—rescue of  individuals in distress and trans-
port to a place of  safety—was itself  not wrongful.  Again, the fact that the 
SAR Convention provides coastal states no mechanism to ascertain a rescued 
persons’ refugee status also tends to support a fi nding of  no responsibility. 
Such responsibility would be more likely established, however, in cases where 
there was evidence that the state had provided fi nancial support to the NGO 
or had otherwise directed its operations or the practice was widespread or 
systematic.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND OBSERVATIONS
The events of  the past year represent a profound and aggressive shift in 
policy towards NGOs in the Central Mediterranean. In coordination with 
the GNA in Libya and with the support of  the EU, Italy has undermined the 
efforts of  NGOs through negative rhetoric, facilitated their exclusion from 
international waters, and threatened them with the possibility of  criminal 
sanctions. It also appears to be laying the foundation for returns to Libya that 
would skirt obligations under international human rights law. 
Libya’s declared exclusionary zone is completely inconsistent with appli-
cable international law. Such blatant disregard for the norms enshrined in 
international instruments and through customary practice demands a res-
ponse, and the international community’s lack of  immediate condemnation 
is troubling. Libya’s practice should be challenged in court so as to reaffi rm 
the principles of  freedom of  navigation outlined in UNCLOS and customary 
practice, and it should also be publically condemned by the state and regional 
actors from which Libya’s GNA is currently soliciting fi nancial support.  
The outcomes of  the investigations and possible criminal prosecutions 
of  NGOs—specifi cally Jugend Rettet and MSF—are uncertain and will de-
pend on whether evidence emerges of  communication or coordination with 
migrant smugglers. Absent such evidence, NGOs would have powerful de-
fenses under Italian criminal law, but given the high number of  actors invol-
ved it is not unreasonable imagine the discovery of  some evidence of  at least 
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minimal contacts between NGOs and those organizing irregular migrant 
transport. Should evidence of  such communications emerge, a conviction 
and signifi cant penalties could very likely result. In light of  past practice and 
the timing of  recent criminal actions, Italy’s real intent may be to deter further 
operations or compel acceptance of  the Code of  Conduct.
Italy also appears to be considering closing its ports to some or all NGOs 
and laying a foundation to redirect them to Libya. While the difference be-
tween a “place of  safety” and a place that would comply with the principles 
of  non-refoulment may be limited, the specifi c political conditions that currently 
exist in Libya may make this difference exploitable. Recent Italian and EU 
initiatives to improve detention conditions in Libya tend to indicate that such 
returns are a goal in the short or medium term, and such a strategy would be 
consistent with current and historic efforts at border externalization.  While 
it is unlikely that any of  the NGOs currently operating in the Central Medi-
terranean would participate in such an effort, the emergence this summer of  
one anti-immigrant vessel in the region suggests that complicit actors may 
exist.
The most likely outcome of  the recent shift in policy towards NGO de-
ployers is that such operations will cease altogether as organizations fi nd that 
their operational model is no longer sustainable. Such a result is not itself  
altogether negative. The crisis of  migration in the Mediterranean is funda-
mentally a problem that must be resolved by state actors either individually or 
through regional organizations. The images of  Spanish and American wars-
hips taking a secondary role to private rescue vessels in many ways represent 
an inversion of  traditional state and private roles and point to a broader ab-
dication of  state responsibility. The international SAR framework establishes 
states as the primary actors in ensuring safety at sea, and it incumbent on 
these actors to take responsibility for the ongoing humanitarian tragedy in 
the Mediterranean.
Italy’s actions must also be viewed in the context of  a continued failure 
on the part of  the EU to establish an equitable mechanism for resettling 
migrants, asylum-seekers and refugees. Through its sustained national SAR 
operations and reception and processing of  over half  a million individuals in 
the past four years, Italy has performed work that rightly should be done by 
other EU states and the community as a whole. This allocation of  responsi-
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bility is not consistent with the principle of  solidarity, and Italy’s recent policy 
response may be seen as a result of  legitimate frustration. The EU’s support 
of  that policy is truly disheartening.
Recent reports indicate migrant deaths have dropped signifi cantly since 
the introduction of  the Libyan exclusion zone, although it is far too soon 
to say if  this trend will persist. Given the danger associated with irregular 
maritime transport, it may be that a model that seeks to reduce embarkations 
has benefi ts, especially if  joined with a comprehensive program of  economic 
development in origin and transit states and increased mechanisms for legal 
migration. But such action must occur within a framework of  laws, and cu-
rrent policies seek to evade the rule of  law, outsource state responsibility for 
controlling its own borders, and intimidate organizations dedicated to the 
humanitarian purpose of  saving lives. Such a program represents a profound 
failure of  governance.
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